Abstract-This paper proposes to build overlays that help in the monitoring of long-term availability histories of hosts, with a focus on large-scale distributed settings where hosts may be selfish or colluding (but not malicious). Concretely, we focus on the important problems of selection and discovery of such an availability monitoring overlay. We motivate six significant goals for these problems-the first three goals are consistency, verifiability, and randomness in selecting the availability monitors of nodes, so as to be probabilistically resilient to selfish and colluding nodes. The next three goals are discoverability, load balancing, and scalability in finding these monitors. We then present AVMON, an availability monitoring overlay that is the first system to satisfy all the above six requirements. The core algorithmic contribution of this paper is a range of protocols for discovering the availability monitoring overlay in a scalable and efficient manner, given any arbitrary monitor selection scheme that is consistent and verifiable. We mathematically analyze the performance of AVMON's discovery protocols with respect to scalability and discovery time of monitors. Most interestingly, we are able to derive optimal variants of AVMON, with the aim of minimizing memory, bandwidth, computation, and discovery time of monitors (or a subset of these metrics). Our analysis indicates that these optimal variants are also practically feasible. Finally, we perform extensive experimental evaluations of AVMON by using three types of availability traces-synthetic, from PlanetLab, and from a peer-to-peer system (Overnet). Our results demonstrate that AVMON would work well in a wide variety of distributed systems.
INTRODUCTION
L ARGE-SCALE distributed applications running atop peerto-peer (P2P) settings, as well as PlanetLab [2] and Enterprise Grids [3] , have to deal with the phenomenon of churn. Churn refers to rapid and continuous arrival and departure, failure, and birth and death of computer hosts (nodes) in the system. Such availability variation across nodes and across time has recently led to the design of many availability-aware strategies for distributed computing problems such as replication, multicast, etc. [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] . These strategies aim to make such distributed systems churn resistant and churn adaptive.
However, such availability-aware strategies necessarily rely on the presence of an underlying availability monitoring service. The high-level goal of an availability monitoring service is to maintain long-term availability information for each host (i.e., for each node) in the system. While a few availability monitoring solutions have been proposed in the literature (e.g., [4] , [5] , and [8] ), the generic availability monitoring problem has not been addressed as yet. This paper is the first to explicitly define goals for the availability monitoring problem to address these goals with a general and overlay-independent solution and to explore the optimality of discovery protocols for the overlay.
The problem challenge, in the availability monitoring overlay problem, comes from the fact that nodes may be selfish or colluding. Such nodes are not malicious but report higher-than-measured availabilities for themselves and their "friend" nodes (we will elaborate on this soon). Nevertheless, the benefits of an availability monitoring service that overcomes this challenge are numerous and varied. Applications that rely on such a service include availability-based replica selection [4] , [5] , [6] , [9] , availability-based parent selection in overlay multicast trees [6] , and implementation of availability-based reliability predicates for multicast [8] . In fact, Godfrey et al. recently showed in [6] that with detailed availability history about each node in the system, one can design "smart" node selection strategies for the replication of a service or a file and that these outperform availabilityagnostic strategies. Finally, availability histories of nodes can even be used to predict availability of individual nodes in the future, e.g., [7] .
Concretely, this availability monitoring problem consists of two orthogonal subproblems: 1) Selection and Discovery of the Availability Monitoring Overlay, for each node x, select and discover a list of nodes who monitor node x, and 2) Availability History Maintenance, what is the exact mechanism used by a monitor of a given node x to store x's availability history. While several different techniques have been proposed for the subproblem 2, i.e., how a monitor maintains history (see, e.g., [4] and [7] ), the solution space for subproblem 1 is relatively less explored. In other words, any existing technique for availability history maintenance (e.g., raw, aged, recent, etc. [7] ) can be used orthogonally with a given availability monitoring overlay.
Thus, our focus in this paper is only on the more challenging subproblem 1: of selection and discovery of the Availability Monitoring Overlay. Formally, this problem can be stated as follows: (following the notation of [8] ). For each node x, select and discover a small subset of nodes to monitor x. Denote this monitoring set of x as P SðxÞ, called the pinging set of node x. Each of the nodes in P SðxÞ is responsible for monitoring node x's long-term availability history. Similarly, node x might in turn be asked to monitor the availability of a small set of other nodes-this is called T SðxÞ, or the target set of x. The T S and P S relationships are inverses of each other.
We assume a system model where nodes may be selfish or colluding. A node may have a fixed number of colluding friends that misreport its availability. These colluder relationships are already present before our protocol runs, and nodes are not compromised thereafter. Note that we are assuming that nodes have unique identifiers and cannot spoof messages; otherwise, a Sybil attack [10] would be unavoidable. A selfish node that reports higher than actual availability 1 for itself could manage to obtain higher reliability from multicast [6] , [8] or cause service outage for systems that rely on high availability nodes [4] , [5] , [6] , [9] . This makes the design of an availability monitoring service challenging, and none of the existing solutions in literature appear to solve this problem. Even though the selfish and colluding model does not include malicious or Byzantine behaviors, it is still a challenging problem in practical settings such as the ones described above.
Design goals. To address the above challenges, we specify six goals for our problem. The first three goals are for the selection of the pinging set of a node-consistency, verifiability, and randomness. In addition, we also desire discoverability, i.e., a node should be able to locate its pinging set and target set quickly and easily, and in a manner that is load balanced and scalable. These six requirements can be stated concretely as follows:
1. Consistency. Given two nodes x, y, the relationship of whether or not y 2 P SðxÞ, should be consistent, i.e., this relationship should not change due to any factors such as joining and leaving of nodes in the system, variation of size of the system, etc. This ensures that each node will always be monitored by a consistent set of other nodes, regardless of whatever else happens in the system. Consistency is required in order to maintain long-term availability history of node x at each of its monitors and to avoid having to transfer such histories upon node churn. Consistency can also avoid pollution of monitoring node sets with colluders. Finally, consistency is related to the next important property called Verifiability. 2. Verifiability. Given two nodes x, y, any third node should be able to correctly verify whether y 2 P SðxÞ or not. This is an important requirement as this prevents selfish nodes from selecting and advertising its colluding nodes as being in its P SðxÞ. 3. Randomness. This requirement stands for uniform randomness and says that given a node x, P SðxÞ should contain other nodes picked uniformly at random: 1) in an identically distributed fashion and 2) independently of one another. Condition 1 both reduces the chances of a node's colluder being one of its monitors and helps in load balancing. Condition 2 reduces the chance that groups of nodes will be correlated in being present together in several pinging sets. Such correlation can be harmful since a group of colluding nodes, appearing together in multiple pinging sets, could potentially jeopardize the availability calculation for all these monitored nodes. 4. Discoverability. Any node x should be able to discover its P SðxÞ and T SðxÞ quickly. Further, any other node y should be able to locate at least a constant number of (any) given node x's P SðxÞ. This enables protocols using the availability service, e.g., [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] , and [9] , to gather information about individual nodes' availability. We do not consider the problem of aggregating node availability histories in this paper. 5. Load balancing. For discovery of pinging sets, the message overhead, memory overhead, and computational overhead should each be uniformly distributed across all nodes. 6. Scalability. For discovery of pinging sets, the pernode message overhead, computational overhead, and memory overhead should each be low and scalable. Existing solutions. Existing availability monitoring overlay schemes in the literature today predominantly adopt one of the following three approaches-self-reporting, centralized, or DHT-based. 1) Self-reporting relies on a node reporting its own availability (i.e., P SðxÞ ¼ fxg). 2) A centralized approach uses a central availability monitor (i.e., P SðxÞ ¼ y 0 , where y 0 is a specific node or a small fixed subset of nodes). 3) A DHT-based approach uses a P2P distributed hash table (DHT) [11] , [12] overlay to decide the monitoring set for a node, e.g., akin to [4] , [5] , and [13] .
Each of the above existing schemes has disadvantages, and none of them satisfies all conditions 1-6, we laid down above. First, self-reporting does not follow randomness and thus allows nodes to potentially lie about their own availability by reporting arbitrarily high values. Second, central monitoring is neither load balanced nor scalable. If a central server were used to monitor, say, 1 Million nodes (say, once every 10 seconds, with 10 bytes forward and 10 bytes reply payloads), the server's bandwidth consumption would be 16 Mbps. This is a high bandwidth since it is dedicated solely to the monitoring process-additionally, node joins, failures, and departures would need to be communicated to the server correctly. One could potentially address this by using a cluster of monitoring servers; however, unavailability of the cluster (e.g., due to a network outage) would cause the availability monitoring service to be unavailable too. 1 . Avoiding availability underreporting requires tracking nodes' application activity and thus an application-specific solution. Our goal is only application-independent solutions. These issues can be addressed using a decentralized approach. A DHT-based approach would typically decide the P SðxÞ for a node x based on the position of the hash of x in a DHT ring by selecting the neighboring K nodes with id's around the hashed nodeID of x (i.e., a "replica set" around a hashed value). Unfortunately, this (and other hash-based approaches) does not satisfy either Consistency or Randomness and has problems with respect to verifiability. Consistency may be violated when there is churn, e.g., a newly born node joining very close to the hashed value of x, changes x's monitor set. This could cause frequent transfers of node x's availability history across its monitors. Randomness is violated because the Condition 2 above is not satisfied-two nodes y, z that are in a P SðxÞ are likely to hash to nearby points on the ring and thus are likely to appear together in other pinging sets as well (of other nodes that hash nearby). Finally, verifiability could be expensive under node churn-birth of new nodes that hash on the ring in between a previously verified monitor's hash, and x's hash will require monitors to be updated. Such overhead is avoided by consistent monitor selection in our new system called AVMON.
In-brief contributions of this paper. This paper presents AVMON, the first complete system for selection and discovery of an availability monitoring overlay, in order to satisfy all the six properties of consistency, verifiability, randomness, discoverability, load balance, and scalability. The two core algorithmic contributions of the current paper are 1) a distributed, efficient, scalable, and load-balanced algorithm for discovery of monitors according to any consistent and verifiable selection scheme, and 2) derivation of optimal variants of this discovery protocol, in order to optimize different combinations from among the metrics of memory and communication bandwidth (M), discovery time (D), and computation complexity (C). Specifically, for contribution 2, we discover three variants of AVMON that satisfy different optimality conditions-MD (optimal with respect to M and D), DC (optimal with respect to D and C), and MDC (optimal with respect to M, D, and C). The AVMON system uses the consistent hash-based pinging set selection leveraged from [8]-we describe this briefly and assume it in the rest of the paper. The AVMON system itself also includes practical optimizations for our algorithms in order to address high-churn systems. We have implemented AVMON, and our evaluation using three types of churn traces-synthetic, from PlanetLab, and from a peer-to-peer system (Overnet)-shows that AVMON would work well in a variety of churned distributed systems.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses other related work. Section 3 describes the basic AVMON algorithms, and Section 4 presents analysis, and Section 5 provides experimental results, and Section 6 concludes.
OTHER RELATED WORK
Section 1 discussed existing availability monitoring approaches and systems that use such a monitoring service. This section briefly touches on other work that is related to our approach.
Distributed membership maintenance protocols have been the focus of several researchers. The goal of these protocols is to have each node maintain a neighbor list, which then defines a membership graph in the system. SWIM [14] and the gossip-based membership protocol by van Renesse et al. [15] use probabilistic mechanisms to have each node maintain a complete neighbor list of all nodes in the system (i.e., a complete membership graph).
Several systems have aimed to build a random membership graph among the nodes of a distributed system (without attention to consistency or verifiability). The SCAMP membership system [16] works by having each joining node initiate several joining requests, which then undergo random walks and probabilistic inclusion in the membership lists of recipient nodes. The CYCLON system [17] works by having each node periodically exchange its neighbor lists with a random neighbor and pick a new neighbor list from the union of these lists. T-Man [18] is yet another membership protocol that is able to support a generic class of membership graph predicates, thus allowing arbitrary membership graphs (such as random ones) to be formed by local node actions.
Somewhat like SCAMP, AVMON uses a random spanning tree approach to have joining nodes inform a subset of other nodes of their presence. AVMON also uses a mechanism similar to (but simpler than) CYCLON to constantly change the neighbor lists of nodes. While the goal of CYCLON was to have the neighbor lists change to combat system churn, AVMON's goal is to also use the neighbor lists to discover monitoring relationships among node pairs. Although AVMON has a few design decisions similar to some of the above systems (as noted), none of these systems addresses availability monitoring as a first class problem. While the constructed membership graphs are random, the conditions of consistency and verifiability are not addressed by these systems.
Finally, as noted before, the monitoring relationship in this paper is borrowed from our previous work [8] . However, that paper [8] did not address the scalable discovery of monitors (as is the focus of the current paper). Instead, Pongthawornkamol and Gupta [8] had each node broadcast (to everyone in the system) whenever it joined the system-this led to quick discovery but used a very high message bandwidth. We label this approach in [8] as Broadcast and compare it analytically with our new AVMON approaches (see Section 4).
THE AVMON APPROACH-OVERVIEW AND ALGORITHM
This section first discusses the system model, then gives a brief overview of the AVMON approach, and then describes individual components of the AVMON algorithms. System model and problem. We assume a distributed system where each node is uniquely identified. Although we assume static IP addresses through this paper, other static identifiers can be used instead, e.g., user id's in a P2P system [19] . Each node may join, leave the system or fail, and rejoin. A node that is in the system is said to be online; otherwise, it is offline. In addition, nodes may be born (i.e., join for the first time) and may also die (i.e., leave the system for good). Deaths are silent and not explicit, i.e., a node may leave or fail for the last time without specifying it was a death. As noted in Section 1, each node may be selfish and colluding. That is, each node would like to have its availability seen as high as possible by the system. In addition, a given node may have up to a constant number of colluders ("friends") that always misreport its availability. However, nodes do not have any other selfish behavior, nor are they malicious or Byzantine. We assume that communication between pairs of nodes is reliable and timely if both nodes are currently alive.
Nodes are assumed to have persistent storage that can be retrieved only when the node is online-this is used to store availability information about other monitored nodes. We also assume that every node uses the same parameter N, representing the system size, i.e., number of online nodes. We assume that at all times, the actual system size is stable and does not vary much around N. This assumption is true in practice in a wide variety of distributed systems [19] , [20] , [21] , [22] -we elaborate in Section 3.1. Our algorithm analysis (Section 4) holds true as long as the actual system size varies always within a constant factor of the parameter N.
Recall that our problem is to select and discover, for each node x, a set of pinging set nodes P SðxÞ that will monitor x's availability. In addition, node x needs to be informed of nodes in its target set T SðxÞ (the inverse of P Sð:Þ) that it needs to monitor. Our goal is to satisfy all the properties (1)-(6) described in Section 1.
AVMON overview. First (Section 3.1), AVMON relies on a hash-based implementation of the monitoring relationship. This hash-based function can be executed by any node in the system and determines if a given arbitrary pair of nodes x, y is related by y 2 P SðxÞ (or vice versa). We chose a hash-based implementation because it is consistent, verifiable, and random. Second (Section 3.2), in order to discover any consistent and verifiable monitoring relationships (such as the one in Section 3.1), AVMON maintains and uses a coarse overlay. Each node maintains a fixed-size neighbor list, called the coarse view, that is, a random subset of the remaining nodes in the system. This coarse overlay is used by nodes to discover monitoring relationships between other pairs of nodes and inform the relevant nodes of such discovery. The protocol for coarse overlay maintenance and neighbor discovery is scalable and load balanced. Finally (Section 3.3), the P Sð:Þ sets are used to monitor other nodes in a scalable manner, with optimizations.
Monitor Selection Scheme-Using Consistent Hashing
This section describes a consistent, verifiable, and random, scheme that AVMON uses in selecting when a given node x is a monitor for another given node y. We leverage this scheme from our previous work [8] . Given < IP address; portnumber > 's (alternatively static id's) for two nodes x and y, in order to determine if x 2 P SðyÞ, we use a consistent one-way hash function H with range normalized to real interval [0, 1] (MD-5 or SHA-1 could be used), as well as two consistent parameters K and N.
Here, K is a small fixed number (typically a constant), and N is a fixed parameter that reflects the expected system size. Even though distributed systems undergo churn, the actual system size stays quite stable. For instance, Bhagwan et al. [19] shows that the system size in Overnet varies by a factor of 2 over one week and by a factor of 3 over a month. Further, Chu et al. [20] and Stutzbach and Rejaie [22] show that the Gnutella system size varies within a factor of 2 per day and per month, and Hei et al. [21] shows that in P2P streaming systems, the size varies within a factor of 9 per day and per week. Thus, setting N to an approximate value suffices-the properties of our algorithms continue to hold as long as the real system size stays within a constant factor of parameter N. This means that the values of K and N can be rekeyed rather infrequently (e.g., once a month); this can be done by a central trusted server that assigns version numbers for each ðK; NÞ value update. System size estimates can be monitored distributedly via existing protocols such as [23] . We do not discuss rekeying or estimation issues further as they are beyond the paper's scope. Given this, two nodes x, y in AVMON are related as y 2 P SðxÞ , Hðy; xÞ
Here, Hðy; xÞ is a normalized hash of the bit string derived by appending the identifier of x after the identifier of y.
Notice that this relation is not necessarily symmetric, since Hðx; yÞ and Hðy; xÞ are not correlated. It is evident that 1) an expected OðKÞ nodes will be present in P SðxÞ for any node x; 2) this relationship is consistent and verifiable at any third node, as well as random.
Monitor Discovery-Composition and
Maintenance of the Coarse View While the previous section described a specific consistent monitor selection scheme, this section aims at discovering monitors according to any arbitrary monitor selection scheme, as long as this scheme is consistent and verifiable. Such a discovery protocol needs to be efficient, scalable, and load balanced. We enable discovery by having each node maintain a coarse view, a random subset of other nodes in the system. This coarse view is used to discover monitors for other nodes. Although the discovery protocol described below is generic, for concreteness, we will assume the hash-based monitor selection in Section 3.1.
Each node x maintains a set of neighbors in its coarse view, denoted as CV ðxÞ. The size of each node's coarse view is limited to a maximal cvs entries. In order to maintain randomness of the coarse view at each node, we describe two subprotocols below: 1) the joining subprotocol executed for nodes entering (or reentering) the system and 2) the coarse view maintenance and monitor discovery subprotocol.
Joining subprotocol. Fig. 1 describes the join subprotocol. Node x initiates this protocol whenever it either joins the system freshly (i.e., after being born) or rejoins it. The goal of this protocol is to inform a set of other nodes (expected number of cvs) about node x, at any point of time.
The protocol works by having x create a JOIN message, specifying its own id ðxÞ and an integer weight (values of which are detailed in the next paragraph). This JOIN message is sent to a random node to start with (provided either by the system's introducer node or from the old CV ðxÞ if x is rejoining). When a node y receives such a JOIN message with a nonzero weight c, it first checks if x is already present in CV ðyÞ or if jCV ðyÞj ¼ cvs. If neither is true, y includes x in its CV and decrements the weight value c of the JOIN. In any case, y finally forwards two JOIN messages with weights set to ðb c 2 cÞ and ðd c 2 eÞ, respectively, each to a random node from its CV ðyÞ. This ensures that JOIN message weights are conserved.
The goal of this protocol is to have an expected cvs other nodes include given node x in their coarse views by creating a random spanning graph with the requisite number of internal and leaf nodes. Thus, the initial weight assigned to the JOIN message by a freshly joining node (being born) is merely cvs. On the other hand, for a node x that is rejoining the system, this weight is set to the minimum of cvs and the time elapsed since the last departure of node x from the system (time in "protocol periods," term defined in the next paragraph). This is because, once node x leaves the system, the protocol described next (in Fig. 2 ) ensures that the average rate at which nodes delete x from their own coarse view is 1 per protocol period. Section 4 analyzes the join subprotocol in detail, showing that it is unlikely for any given node to receive multiple such JOIN messages and that the spread time of the JOIN information is OðlogðcvsÞÞ with high probability (w.h.p.).
Coarse view maintenance and discovery subprotocol. Fig. 2 shows the pseudocode for maintaining the coarse view and for discovering monitoring relationships. The maintenance protocol described in the figure is executed at each node once every protocol period (also known as a "round")-protocol period durations are fixed at nodes but are executed asynchronously across nodes. The subprotocol at node x has three tasks: to eliminate from CV ðxÞ nodes that have left the system (and may or may not rejoin) and to shuffle CV ðxÞ with new entries (to keep it random), while discovering monitoring relationships in the process.
The detailed protocol operations are given as follows: Once during each protocol period, node x picks a single node z uniformly at random from its CV ðxÞ and pings it-an unresponsive node is removed from the CV . Notice that this pinging is different from the pinging involved in availability monitoring, which we will discuss in Section 3.3. Observe that this implies that a dead node z (i.e., one that has left for good) will eventually be deleted from all coarse views that contained z (Theorem 2 in Section 4.1).
Since an expected cvs nodes know about any given node z and the probability of any of these nodes picking z to ping is 1 cvs per protocol period, the expected number of nodes that delete a nonalive node z from their coarse view is cvs Á 1 cvs ¼ 1 per protocol period. Recall that this motivated the weights assigned to JOIN messages in Fig. 1 .
During each protocol period, node x also picks a random and alive node w 2 CV ðxÞ and fetches its coarse view CV ðwÞ. It checks the hash-consistent condition (Section 3.1) among all pairs of nodes ðu; vÞ and ðv; uÞ, where u 2 CV ðxÞ [ fxg, v 2 CV ðwÞ [ fx; wg, and u 6 ¼ v. Any node pair ðu; vÞ discovered to satisfy the hash-consistent condition are informed via a NOTIFY message sent to both. Finally, to maintain the randomness of coarse views, node x selects a new coarse view CV ðxÞ by selecting cvs elements at random from the set CV ðxÞ [ CV ðwÞ. Observe that the above protocol implies that at any time at node x, the hashconsistent condition for all pairs within CV ðxÞ have already been checked.
The average number of coarse view entries pointing to a node x stays stable because an entry at some other node y's coarse view, pointing to node x, is equally likely to be either: 1) thrown away when y fetches someone else's coarse view, as it is to be 2) replicated at another node z that fetches y's coarse view (containing entry x). Section 4 will show that 1) if a node and its potential monitor both stay alive for long enough, they will eventually discover each other (Theorem 1) and 2) the expected discovery time is small for reasonably small values of cvs.
Using the Monitoring Overlay
This section briefly discusses how the monitoring overlay is used to track availability, how nodes report their monitors, and an important optimization. Each node x maintains both two lists of node identifiers: P SðxÞ and T SðxÞ. Whenever a NOTIFYðu; xÞ message is received at node x, if node u is not already present in P SðxÞ, the hash-consistent condition Hðu; xÞ K N is rechecked and if true, node u is included in P SðxÞ (i.e., node x will be monitored by node u from now on). Similarly, on receipt of a NOTIFYðx; uÞ message at node x, the hash-consistent condition is checked and if true, node u is included in T SðxÞ (i.e., node x will monitor u's availability from now on). This checking avoids the addition of new T SðÞ or P SðÞ entries if spurious NOTIFY messages are sent by selfish nodes that attempt to recruit invalid monitors.
Each node x periodically sends monitoring pings to each of the nodes in T SðxÞ and records this information in its persistent storage. Please note that monitoring pings are different from the pings in the protocol in Fig. 1 . Monitoring pings are sent out periodically, once every monitoring period. The monitoring period value may be different from the protocol period in Fig. 2 . As noted in Section 1, the granularity in which measured availability information about T SðxÞ nodes is stored at x can be arbitrary, i.e., stored availability information could either be raw, aged, or recent, etc.
Whenever a node y wants to discover a given node x's pinging set nodes, it is the burden of node x to report to node y at least the requested number of its monitoring nodes. For instance, node y's policy may be to require x to report at least l ð KÞ monitoring nodes. Node x can then select any l of its P SðxÞ nodes to report to y but cannot lie about these, since y can check the hash-consistent condition for each reported monitor. Node y can then ask each reported monitor individually for x's availability history. Section 4.3 analyzes how large K needs to be to support such an "l out of K" policy.
Optimization-forgetful pinging. As nodes die in the distributed system, T SðxÞ and P SðxÞ may become filled with garbage nodes that are actually dead. Since deaths are silent, there is no way of knowing whether an unresponsive node will rejoin or not, thus these garbage elements cannot be deleted. Instead, we propose here an optimization to reduce the rate of monitoring pings sent to these unresponsive nodes, in order to reduce the bandwidth consumption due to dead nodes but without affecting the precision of availability measurement.
The optimization works as follows at node x-if a node u in T SðxÞ has been unresponsive for time t, and t > , where is a time threshold, and t s ðuÞ was the last time instance that node u was pinged successfully by node x, then pick u to ping with probability cÁtsðuÞ t s ðuÞþt , per monitoring protocol period. This is motivated by the need to ping u less frequently if it has been away for long (denominator) and also to send it at least c 2 pings per monitoring period, from each monitor, for up to t s ðuÞ time units after it went offline (numerator). Section 5 evaluates this optimization.
ANALYSIS: AVMON PERFORMANCE AND OPTIMAL VARIANTS
We first analyze in Section 4.1 the performance of the joining and coarse view maintenance protocols (from Section 3.2), then Section 4.2 studies different optimal variants of AVMON discovery. Section 4.3 discusses values for K and the effect of colluding nodes.
Basic Analysis
As a precursor to our optimality discussion, this section first analyzes the join protocol and its dissemination time (Fig. 1) . Then, we derive the discovery time, as well as overheads of memory, message, and computation, for the AVMON protocol (Fig. 2) . We will assume that cvs ¼ oð ffiffiffiffi ffi N p Þ in all of the discussion below. Coarse view analysis-spread and dissemination time of JOIN information. Since the weight of the very first JOINðx; wÞ message from a freshly born node x is set to cvs, no more than cvs nodes can add x to their coarse views right after x's birth. In addition, when the node rejoins, it sets the initial weight to make up for the lost number of entries pointing to it (Fig. 1) , thus keeping the expected number of coarse views pointing to x, at cvs (see Section 3.2) .
We analyze the expected dissemination time of a newly born node x's first JOIN message. This upper bound also holds for JOINs sent by rejoining nodes. Notice that the spread of JOINðx; :Þ messages, via the random coarse view graph, basically builds a random spanning tree with cvs total nodes (internal þ leaf nodes). This gives a spread time of OðlogðcvsÞÞ time for the JOIN information, unless a large number of nodes receive duplicate JOINðx; :Þ messages. In fact, this "unless" clause is improbable-the probability of a given node receiving a JOINðx; :Þ message in a given round with m forwarding nodes is ¼ 1Àð1 À Thus, w.h.p., the JOINðx; :Þ spreads quickly to the requisite nodes in time that is OðlogðcvsÞÞ. In the worst case, this time is OðlogðNÞÞ.
Discovery time of the Hash-Consistent Condition for a node pair (D). First, we have the following theorem for eventual discovery of monitors: Theorem 1. If ðx; yÞ satisfy the hash-consistent condition and if nodes x, y stay alive for long enough in the system, then x will eventually discover y, i.e., y 2 T SðxÞ eventually.
This is true because of AVMON's continuous exchange and shuffling of coarse views. Node y will see node x an infinite number of times in its coarse view, and thus, node y is guaranteed to eventually pick x to exchange coarse views with (Fig. 2) , during which y will check for the hashconsistent condition with x.
Second, we show that discovery is in fact fast. We do so by bounding from above the expected discovery time, where we are interested only in an asymptotic bound. Given a pair of nodes x, y, the discovery of the monitoring relationship between x and y occurs at the first instance when some node (not necessarily either x or y) checks for the hash-consistent condition with the pairs ðx; yÞ and ðy; xÞ. Based on the protocol in Fig. 2 , this check happens only during the coarse view fetches. Given a node u that fetches the coarse view of another node w, the probability that x will be present in CV ðuÞ and that y will be present in CV ðwÞ is ¼ ð
N 2 (we ignore the residual probability of y 2 CV ðuÞ and x 2 CV ðwÞ, since we are interested only in asymptotic bounds). Thus, the probability that the ðx; yÞ pair is not checked by this particular coarse view fetch is ð1 À cvs 2 N 2 Þ. Now, notice that per protocol period, there are a total of N such coarse view fetches. Putting all this together, we can derive the probability of the pair ðx; yÞ being checked by at least one of the fetches in one protocol period as P r Checkedðx; yÞ
N :
In the last inequality, we have used the following inequality: for large M, ð1 À
À1 . Thus, the expected time to discovery of the monitoring relationship for an arbitrary node pair ðx; yÞ can be bounded as (in number of protocol periods):
Notice that with cvs ¼ oð ffiffiffiffi ffi N p Þ and N ! 1, the exponential series expansion can be used to simplify this as E½D upper bound ' N cvs 2 . In reality, when a node x joins and leaves continuously, the real physical discovery time of a valid given monitor y of it will be higher than E½D. Specifically, the discover protocol of AVMON is a memoryless process. Thus, for a node with a periodic pattern of u uptime seconds followed by d downtime seconds, the actual discovery time of any given monitor of it is ¼ E½D Á u uþd . Effect of dead nodes. From the first three lines in Fig. 2 , we have the following: Theorem 2. A dead node z (i.e., one that has left for good) will eventually be deleted from all coarse views that contained z.
In addition, a node x with dead node z 2 CV ðxÞ, will delete z w.h.p. ð1 À 1 N Þ within T Ã ¼ ðcvs Á logðNÞÞ protocol periods. This is because the probability of deletion of z from CV ðxÞ in T rounds is
Also, we pointed out previously that the death of nodes from the system may cause T SðxÞ to contain garbage entries. This is unavoidable since deaths are silent. However, if N longterm is the number of nodes that has been born in the system recently, then the expected size of T SðxÞ is K Á N longterm =N. For minimal-death PlanetLab-like Grid systems, N can be chosen to be the maximal number of machines, thus E½jT SðxÞj K. For P2P systems, if N longterm is within a constant factor of N, E½jT SðxÞj is still bounded. Further, our forgetful pinging optimization (Section 3.3) keeps the bandwidth effect of garbage entries referring to dead nodes very low. Experiments in Section 5 elaborate on the benefits of forgetful pinging.
Memory, message overhead (M). The per-node x memory is ðjCV ðxÞj þ jP SðxÞj þ jT SðxÞjÞ, or Oðcvs þ 2KÞ¼ OðcvsÞ, since typically K < cvs. The message overhead at each node is OðcvsÞ bytes per protocol period for coarse view maintenance and an additional OðKÞ per monitoring protocol period. The first of these terms dominates but stays small. For instance, with cvs ¼ Oð ffiffiffiffi ffi N 4 p Þ (Optimal-MDC-see Section 4.2 below) at N ¼ 1 Million (thus, cvs ¼ 32), protocol period ¼ monitoring period ¼ 1 second, and 8 bytes per entry, the per-node bandwidth is 256 bps, which is reasonably small.
Computational overhead (C). This is Oðcvs 2 Þ per protocol period per node and arises from the hashconsistency checking in the coarse view fetches. For N ¼ 1 Million, cvs ¼ ffiffiffiffi ffi N 4 p (Optimal-MDC-see Section 4.2 below), this turns out to be 1,000 hash computations per protocol period. However, this is quite fast-in [24] , with the C++ implementation of MD-5 hash running on a 2.1-GHz P4, WinXP SP 1 machine, 1,000 hash computations (each with 12 bytes) take about 0.375 ms. This is reasonably small, e.g., protocol period ¼ 10 s implies that hashing consumes 0.003 percent CPU time.
Optimal Variants of AVMON
From the analysis in the previous section, the size of the coarse view ðcvsÞ determines a trade-off between memory, communication bandwidth, and computation on one hand and discovery time on the other hand. However, an application may be interested in optimizing only some of these metrics, and not others. For instance, if AVMON is run within the hosts of an in-house PC cluster connected over a high bandwidth LAN, we may be interested in minimizing only the computation (C) and discovery time (D) but not the bandwidth or memory. Alternatively, AVMON being run in a PlanetLab-like cluster with multicore machines may not care about computation but would like to optimize discovery time (D) and memory and bandwidth (M). Of course, there are applications that would like to optimize all of M, D, and C.
Below, we mathematically derive the values of cvs for each of these three optimal variants (MD, MDC, and DC) and then discuss the practicality of these optimal variants (notice that optimizing MC does not make sense since both M and C increase with cvs).
Optimality analysis 1-optimal-MD. We would like to minimize both memory utilization and message bandwidth (M) at each node (cvs units), as well as the discovery time (D), which is E½D ¼ . Thus, we want to minimize the additive function:
Although the units of M and D are different, we use an additive function because we are interested in minimizing both. Using a constant multiplicative factor with one of the terms would yield the same asymptotic result as below. Differentiating f with respect to cvs gives us
At this optimum, Optimality analysis 2-optimal-MDC. We would like to minimize both memory utilization and message bandwidth ðMÞ at each node (cvs units), the discovery time
, as well as the computational overhead ðCÞ. Thus, we want to minimize the function:
Differentiating g with respect to cvs gives us
Notice that . Optimality analysis 3-optimal-DC. To minimize the discovery time (D) and computation complexity (C), the reader will notice that the optimizing function can be derived in a manner similar to the function g in the Optimal-MDC analysis above and gives an optimal cvs OptimalÀDC ¼ ffiffiffiffi ffi N 4 p . Table 1 summarizes the results of our optimality analysis and also compares the benefits of the AVMON approach to the naïve Broadcast-based discovery algorithm in [8] .
In practice-optimal-MDC AVMON ðcvs ¼ ffiffiffiffi ffi N 4 p Þ. As mentioned previously, for N ¼ 1 Million, cvs ¼ ffiffiffiffi ffi N 4 p ¼ 32, and K ¼ log 2 ðNÞ ¼ 20, the size of CV ðxÞ is 192 bytes, and the bandwidth is 192 bytes per protocol period. The expected discovery time is 1,000 time units; however, a given node x discovers one new pinging set node on average at least every 50 protocol periods. The computational overhead due to hash calculation is also low. Finally, the probability of partitioning in the coarse view graph is very low-Kermarrec et al. [25] shows that this probability will be close to zero if cvs ¼ ðlogðNÞÞ, which is true in all the optimal variants above.
Continuous Monitoring and Collusion Resilience
We now analyze how large K (size of P SðÞ) should be to ensure continuous monitoring of all nodes. We also derive bounds on pinging set size and analyze the effect of colluders.
Choosing K. The value of K should be chosen so that every given node is continuously monitored w.h.p. This requires that for every node x in the system, we have that 1) at least one node present in P SðxÞ is up w.h.p. at a given point of time, and 2) jP SðxÞj ! lð¼ Oð1ÞÞ w.h.p.. Condition 2 is essential in order to support "l out of K" policies described in Section 3.3. We show below that both Conditions 1 and 2 can be satisfied w.h.p. by setting
, where a is the systemwide average node availability.
First, for condition 1, the probability that for node x with jP SðxÞj ¼ K, at least one P SðxÞ node is up at a given point of time is P rðjfP SðxÞg alive j > 0Þ
Þ . Choosing c such that c logð 1 1Àa Þ ! 2, we calculate the probability that every node's P Sð:Þ has at least one node alive, as follows:
Second, for Condition 2 above, i.e., for jP SðxÞj ! l to be true w.h.p. for a constant l, we show that K ! ðl þ 2Þ Á logðNÞ suffices. This derivation comes about because at K ¼ ðl þ 2Þ Á logðNÞ, the probability of a node x having fewer than l nodes in its P SðxÞ is
Thus, the probability that every one of the N nodes in the system will have its jP Sð:Þj ! l is
Finally, Balls and Bins analysis ( [26] , Theorem 1) says that throwing OðN Á logðNÞÞ balls into N bins ensures that Resilience to collusion. The AVMON system avoids nodes misreporting their own availability, but there is the possibility that a node may be able to recruit colluders to misreport its availability.
First, suppose each node x in the system has Cð¼ oð N logðNÞ ÞÞ colluding nodes, i.e., nodes willing to misrepresent x's availability as a value higher than the real value (or as 100 percent). Given K ¼ OðlogðNÞÞ, the probability that no colluders of given node x appear in its P SðxÞ is
Thus, it is probabilistically impossible for a node to have its P Sð:Þ set polluted by any colluders. Second, we analyze the systemwide collusion resilience. If there are D such colluding relationships systemwide (across any colludee-colluder node pair) and D ¼ oð N logðNÞ Þ, K ¼ OðlogðNÞÞ, then the probability that none of these pairs are valid monitors is
Thus, none of the colluders will have any effect on the system, w.h.p. The reader may notice the caveat with this result-the fraction of colluders tolerated ðoð 1 logðNÞ ÞÞ decreases with N. However, the number of colluders tolerated ðoð N logðNÞ ÞÞ itself grows with N, thus AVMON is able to withstand larger and larger colluding groups as the system size increases.
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
The goal of this section is to evaluate the performance of our AVMON implementation for a variety of distributed system settings. In order to do this, we choose the approach of evaluating AVMON under several workloads of availability variation (i.e., churn), ranging from synthetic models to traces obtained from real systems (PlanetLab and Overnet). Our AVMON implementation was done in C. All our tracedriven discrete event simulations were run on a 2.80-GHz Intel P4 CPU machine with 2 Gbytes of RAM and Fedora Core 4 Linux.
We studied the effect of five different availability (or churn) models. These fall into three classes: 1) synthetic churn models (labeled in our plots as STAT, SYNTH, and SYNTH-BD), 2) churn traces from PlanetLab all pairs pings (labeled PL) [6] , and 3) traces from the Overnet P2P system (labeled OV) [19] . STAT models a static network with no churn, while SYNTH models a system where nodes join and leave under exponential and memoryless rates (each per minute, giving per-day a 20 percent birth rate, and 20 percent death rate). All models in category 1) ensure a stable system size, i.e., number of online nodes. PL, OV neither have a stable system size nor an exponential assumption but instead reflect the true availability traces. PL and OV traces were originally once each sec and once each 20 minute, respectively, and are injected as such.
In all these scenarios, we used the Optimal-MDC variant with the following default settings:
, where N was the stable system size for STAT, SYNTH, SYNTH-BD, and the long-term average system size for PL and OV (we set cvs ¼ 4 Á cvs OptimalÀMDC for performance reasons); 3. parameter K ¼ log 2 ðNÞ (see Section 3.1); 4. for Hð:Þ, libSSL's MD5 implementation using the first 64 returned bits; 5. forgetful pinging parameters ¼ 2 minute, c ¼ 1 (see Section 3.3); and 6. monitoring protocol period ¼ 1 minute (see Section 3.3). The metrics of interest measured in the following sections are discovery time and memory, computation, and bandwidth overheads. Each experiment on each of the plots shown below was run for 48 hours. Each point on each plot depicts the average across relevant nodes considered.
Effect of Varying System Size in the STAT, SYNTH, and SYNTH-BD models
This section shows the effect of varying system size N, ranging from 100 to 2,000, on the synthetic models STAT, SYNTH, and SYNTH-BD. We used an initial warm-up period of 1 hour where nodes were born, died, joined, and left according to the respective model. For STAT and SYNTH, a control group, consisting of a new set of nodes numbering 10 percent of the stable system size, was then made to join simultaneously, in order to measure the discovery time of their monitors. Control group nodes subsequently follow the churn model. For SYNTH-BD, the control group was implicit, and contained some nodes born after the warm-up stage. Discovery time. Although the expected number of monitors K ¼ log 2 ðNÞ, we first measure, for each control group node, the time to find at least one of its monitors, i.e., the "discovery time of the first monitor." Fig. 3a plots the average time to discovery of the first monitor for each node in the control group. For each point on the plot, the average was taken over all measured discovery times and by ignoring the one highest measured discovery time data point for that setting. Such points are ignored because they are outliers (the top ignored values were 110 minutes, 72 minutes, and 42 minutes) and would skew our conclusions if included. This plot illustrates two observations about the average discovery time: 1) it stayed consistently below 1 minute (recall that the protocol period itself was 1 minute), and 2) it was not affected by joins and leaves (compare STAT and SYNTH lines), although it appeared to be affected by births and deaths (compare SYNTH and SYNTH-BD lines). For the SYNTH-BD setting, discovery time was measured from among the new nodes born after the warm-up-these numbered as 47 for N ¼ 100, 198 for N ¼ 500, 390 for N ¼ 1;000, and 785 for N ¼ 2;000.
Nevertheless, discovery stayed fast in spite of births and deaths. Figs. 3b and 3c show the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the discovery time for the two models STAT and SYNTH-BD. Observe that in each of these settings, at least 93 percent of first monitors were discovered within 60 seconds. To wrap-up, Fig. 4 shows the average times to discover, for each node, the first L monitors of the node. This plot illustrates that for all churn models, P Sð:Þ nodes were discovered at uniform time intervals. Thus, we conclude that AVMON's discovery time stays low, regardless of birth, death, join, and rejoin.
We can estimate the discovery time of the first monitor for N > 2;000. Specifically, the E½D in Fig. 3a is about 20 seconds for N ¼ 2;000 (SYNTH-BD). Further, the discovery time for any given monitor of a given node grows as ffiffiffiffi ffi N p (Section 4.2, Optimal-MDC), and the system has K ¼ log 2 N. Thus, the discovery time for the first monitor at system online size N is ¼ 20 Á ffiffiffi N p log2N Á log 2 2;000 ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi 2;000 p . For N ¼ 1 Billion nodes, the first monitor discovery time turns out to be 1.44 hours; this is smaller than the average uptime in Overnet (which is several hours).
Computational overhead. Fig. 5 shows that the average computations per second per node varied sublinearly with N, and the per-minute overhead was close to 2 Á cvs 2 . Fig. 6 shows the CDF across nodes. The data showed that even for N ¼ 2;000, the worst-case computation at any node was 0.611 ms per minute, about 1 percent of the CPU. Together, these plots show that the computational overhead of AVMON is not influenced much by churn. Memory usage. The memory at each node x, due to ðCV ðxÞj þ jP SðxÞj þ jT SðxÞjÞ, is plotted in Fig. 7 . Fig. 8 shows the CDF. The measured memory utilization was close to the expected value of ð2K þ cvsÞ. For instance, when N ¼ 2;000 (and K ¼ 11, cvs ¼ 27), Fig. 7 shows that for STAT, the average per-node memory stayed below the expected value of 49 entries. For SYNTH, SYNTH-BD, the average was only slightly above that expected, primarily because of garbage entries in P Sð:Þ; T Sð:Þ sets. Finally, in Fig. 8 , from the CDF's for N ¼ 2;000, we conclude that the memory usage of AVMON is minimally influenced by churn.
Bandwidth. The average outgoing bandwidth for the STAT model is ðK þ cvsÞ per minute. For N ¼ 2;000 (with K ¼ 11, cvs ¼ 27), 8 bytes per coarse view entry, 8 bytes per monitoring ping message, this turned out to be 5.067 bps per node. Section 5.4 studies bandwidth in more detail.
Effect of Varying Coarse View Size in STAT Model
We study the effect of varying cvs. In order to isolate varying cvs from churn, we used the STAT model with the following values for cvs : ðf4; 6; 8; 10g Á ffiffiffiffi ffi N 4 p Þ. Even under the SYNTH model, the indegree distribution of the coarse Fig. 3 . Variation of discovery time, when varying system size in the STAT, SYNTH, and SYNTH-BD models. (a) Average discovery times of first monitors for the control group nodes introduced in the three synthetic models. (b) CDF of the STAT points in Fig. 3a . For all values of N from 100 to 2,000, at least 96 percent of the nodes were discovered in under 30 seconds. (c) CDF of the SYNTH-BD points in Fig. 3a . For all values of N from 100 to 2,000, at least 93.3 percent of the nodes were discovered within 60 seconds. Fig. 4 . Average discovery times of first L monitors (L on x-axis) for each node in control group, for the three synthetic models. view graph was quite uniform: for N ¼ 2;000, cvs ¼ 27, 85 percent nodes had indegree ¼ 27, and only 2 percent had smaller indegree. Fig. 9 shows that the discovery time (average and standard deviation) decreased as cvs increased. The curve for each value of N has a knee at its third data point-increasing cvs beyond this (cvs ¼ 8 Á ffiffiffiffi ffi N 4 p , e.g., for N ¼ 2;000, cvs ' 54), did not improve either the average or variance of discovery time by much. Fig. 10 plots both the memory utilization (left y-axis) and the computational overhead per node (right y-axis). First, notice that for a fixed value of cvs, N had no influence on either memory or computational overhead. Second, increasing cvs too much beyond the curve's knee (in Fig. 9 ) raised the computational overhead. Nevertheless, for practical purposes, this overhead is negligible-even for cvs ¼ 68, the expected 9,375.79 hashes would take only about 3.52 ms to execute (once per minute with a P4 2.1-GHz processor under WinXP SP 1, C++ Visual .NET 2003). Third, the memory varied linearly with cvs-even for cvs ¼ 68, memory usage was 728 bytes (assuming 8 bytes per CV entry). Thus, in practice, the value of cvs should be set based on the knee of the curve in Fig. 9 .
Effect of PlanetLab Traces, Overnet Traces, and a High-Churn Model
We study the effect of injecting availability traces from PlanetLab (PL) and from Overnet (OV). For PL, we set N ¼ 239, and K ¼ 8, cvs ¼ 16. For OV, we had N ¼ 550, and K ¼ 9, cvs ¼ 19. Fig. 11 shows the CDF for discovery time of each node's first monitor. In OV, a total of N longterm ¼ 1; 319 nodes had been born after two days-97.27 percent of these had discovered their first monitors within 63 seconds after birth. For PL, N longterm ¼ 239 after two days, and over 98 percent of nodes' first monitors were discovered within a minute after birth. Fig. 12 shows that per-node memory utilization was uniformly distributed across nodes. The OV line shows that node birth and death cause memory utilization to be higher than the expected value (of 19 þ 2 Á 9 ¼ 37), but no node had over 81 memory entries. For PL, the maximum entry count was 44.
Finally, to study the effect of very high churn, we used a new churn model called SYNTH-BD2. This resembled SYNTH-BD, but had twice the birth and death rate (i.e.,
1;440 per minute). Fig. 13 shows that this made no noticeable difference in discovery time, illustrating that AVMON discovery is churn resistant. Fig. 14 shows the additional memory entries due to the increased churn in SYNTH-BD2 was less than 10 percent over that in SYNTH-BD.
Forgetful Pinging, Optimizations, and Overreporting
Forgetful pinging. We evaluated the practical benefits of the forgetful pinging optimization (see Section 3.3) for the SYNTH churn model. For this experiment, AVMON estimated each node's availability as the fraction of monitoring pings sent to that node, which received a response back. For N ¼ 2;000, Fig. 15 plots the ratio, for each node in the control group, of its estimated availability to its real availability (i.e., actual fraction uptime). While the lack of the forgetful ping optimization ("NON-Forgetful ping in plot") measured availability accurately, the plot for the "Forgetful ping" optimization had an average relative error of less than 5 percent, with a maximal error of 8 percent. In turn, Fig. 16 shows that the optimization reduced bandwidth consumed by "useless pings" (sent by a node to nodes not currently in the system) by an order of magnitude.
Bandwidth. Fig. 17 shows the CDF for the Outgoing Bytes per Second (BW) that nodes incurred in the STAT and OV models. First, in STAT, with N ¼ 2;000 total nodes, 88 percent of the nodes had an outgoing bandwidth below 10 bps. Notice that about 6.5 percent of nodes had a BW above 50 bps. We surmise that this was due to the static nature of the STAT model, which caused indegree degradation, which in turn caused responses to the excessive received pings. To address this, we introduced an optimization (called "PR2") whereby a node that had not received a monitoring ping for two successive protocol periods would force all its coarse view nodes to add it to their own coarse views. Fig. 17 shows that this variant (labeled "STAT-PR2") reduced bandwidth further for the STAT model-the outgoing bandwidth was below 9 bps. In contrast, notice that in the Overnet churn traces (OV), there was constant change in the coarse views due to node birth, death, join, and leave, and consequently, the outgoing bandwidth was more uniform, with 99.85 percent of the nodes spending below 11 bps.
Effect of overreporting attack. Finally, Fig. 18 had a fraction of nodes x-axis) report 100 percent availabilities for all their T Sð:Þ nodes. The plot shows that the fraction of nodes whose measured availability (averaged over their P Sð:Þ nodes) differed from their actual availability by over 0.2 was very small for all the four models SYNTH, SYTNH-BD, PL, OV, and only 3.5 percent nodes were affected in the worst data point (for OV).
Pollution of colluder pinging sets. Section 4.3 showed that AVMON can tolerate w.h.p. colluder set sizes ¼ oð N logðNÞ Þ. We now analyze the effect of varying the fraction of nodes in a single (large) colluder set. Since Byzantine fault-tolerant protocols can tolerate 1/3 of nodes being uncooperative, we say that a P SðÞ is polluted if at least 1/3 of it consists of colluders. Fig. 19 shows the probability of a colluder's converged P SðÞ being polluted ("pollution probability") versus the fraction of colluders.
Although the plot is for N ¼ 10K nodes, the same results hold for any N. We observe two facts: 1) with under 10 percent colluder nodes, the pollution probability is very small; 2) if one wished to keep the pollution probability smaller than the colluder fraction, this is true for colluder groups smaller than 25 percent-thus, with respect to this requirement, AVMON tolerates up to 25 percent nodes being colluders.
CONCLUSION
We presented and evaluated AVMON, a system that selects and discovers a monitoring overlay for monitoring long-term host-level availability information in distributed systems. AVMON selects and discovers per-node monitors in a manner that is consistent, verifiable, and random. The discovery protocol is fast, load balanced, and scalable. It works with arbitrary monitor selection schemes that are consistent and verifiable. We derived protocol variants to minimize different combinations of memory, bandwidth, discovery time, and computation time. The AVMON variant minimizing all metrics (Optimal-MDC) performed well under a variety of churn models-these included three synthetic models and Overnet and PlanetLab availability traces. . For more information on this or any other computing topic, please visit our Digital Library at www.computer.org/publications/dlib.
